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any animal-rights philosophers have emphasized the
importance of recognizing
the inherent or intrinsic
value of animals in encouraging a deeper respect for nonhuman life. The intrinsic value of
animals is contrasted with the perceived
extrinsic instrumental value from the
point of view of human utility. Intrinsic
value is regarded by animal rightists as
taking precedence over an animal's extrinsic value, because animals are ends
in themselves rather than the means to
satisfy purely human ends.
However, we should not overlook the
fact that animals and other existences
are not purely ends in themselves. The
deer has inherent value and a life of its
own but is a means whereby the needs
of predator species, such as the wolf and
tiger, are satisfied. In other words, many
species do have extrinsic value to others.
While this is a fact of nature, it is
what I call a naturalistic fallacy to rationalize from this fact that, since animals prey upon and kill each other,
there can be nothing wrong with humans
doing likewise. Predator species are
always few in number. But the presence
of 6 billion animals the size of Homo
sapiens on this small planet is a biological aberration with devastating ecological consequences when those animals
behave as predators.
In recognizing the extrinsic value of
animals and other living things in their
contribution to the harmony, beauty, and
diversity of the biotic community, the
animal rightist moves conceptually
toward a more holistic, ecological view.
This has been lacking too long in the
movement, as has respect for the intrinsic value of animals as individuals by
the environmental and conservation
movements.
Some philosophers, reflecting a fairly
prevalent social consensus, believe that
domesticated animals that were "created"
by man for specific human use have less
intrinsic value than wild animals. This is
also fallacious, I believe, because it is
indicative of an anthropocentric attitude
toward nonhuman life that embraces the
"naturalistic fallacy" alluded to earlier.
It may be reasoned that a being that is
more intelligent and self-aware than

another has greater intrinsic value. This,
again, could be based upon anthropocentrism and have racist and speciesist
consequences. A hierarchy of intrinsic
value, in terms of creatures' "richness of
experience," can be based upon the
complexity of their nervous systems.
From this perspective (as proposed by
Charles Birch and John B. Cobb in The
Liberation of Life, Cambridge University
Press, 1981), chimpanzees and whales
have more intrinsic value than worms
and mosquitoes. But is not the life of
the worm of equal importance to the
worm itself as is the life of the whale to
the whale? Furthermore, in focusing
upon intrinsic value to the exclusion of
extrinsic value (or vice versa), the
natural paradox between the two is not
appreciated. This is that organisms, such
as worms and soil bacteria, that, from
an anthropocentric perspective, have less
intrinsic value than, say, a more sentient
and sapient wolf or human being,
actually have a greater extrinsic or instrumental value in terms of their contribution to the integrity of the biotic
community. Nothing will grow in
sterilized soil devoid of worms and
microorganisms.
Another considerable aspect, especially of non-sentient (or, more correctly, pre-sentient) existences, is their
potential. The inherent potential of an
individual human being is relatively
finite compared to that of a plant or
bacterium that can multiply asexually
and clone itself. The inherent potential
of rocks, embodying trace minerals, and
of water-the basic elements incorporated into all life forms-is infinite.
Thus, when contemplating that which
St. Francis called "sister" water, we become aware of an existence that is
devoid of consciousness, sentience, and
intrinsic value in terms of having a life
of its own. From that limited perspective, sister water is "inferior" to Homo
sapiens. But, by virtue of her inherent
potential, she is clearly superior, and, in
terms of her extrinsic value to all life,
she embodies those qualities that we
equate with the saintly virtue of selfless
giving to all life. When we begin to
perceive other existences, be it from the
sacramental pantheistic perspective of St.
Francis or from an instrumental yet
holistic view of intrinsic/extrinsic value
and potential, the notion of human
"superiority" is shattered.
It is important, I believe, to consider
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both the intrinsic and extrinsic value of
all existences in arguing the case for
animal rights and conservation. While
"rights" language has its limitations, and
some prefer to speak in terms of human
obligations and duties, a greater appreciation of the extrinsic value of
natural organisms-of their place and
role in nature-will bring an ecological/environmental perspective to the inherent value-oriented approach of the
animal-rights movement and philosophy.
We might ask of the presumedly most
sapient and sentient Earth species with
the acclaimed greatest intrinsic value
what extrinsic value it has in terms of
contributing to the integrity, stability,
and beauty of the biotic community. Had
we the simplicity of bacteria, the humility of the deer, and the wisdom of the
wolf, we might, indeed, be of more
value to the natural world.
The integrity of Creation has been defined by Charles Birch as "the recognition of the integrity and the intrinsic
value of every living creature and the
maintenance of the integrity of the relations of each creature to its environment."1 This is the extrinsic/existential
value of each creature in relation to
other members that comprise the biotic
community, as distinct from any human/instrumental value that we might
place on them.
Birch and Cobb2 have proposed a criterion of richness of experience to help
determine the relative intrinsic value of
different creatures. Based on the assumption that the inner experience of an
animal bears some relation to the complexity of its nervous system, it is
reasonable to posit a hierarchy of intrinsic value. Chimpanzees and whales,
therefore, have more intrinsic value than
worms and mosquitoes. Jay McDanieP
concludes that practicing a biocentric
ethic involves reverence for life, which
is respect and concern for the well-being
and ultimate fulfillment of all sentient
beings. "To say that each and every living creature is important for its own
sake is to say it has intrinsic value. Intrinsic value is itself the value a creature
•
has in itself and for itself."
References
I. Charles Birch, p. 75 in Church & Society: Report and
Background Papers, Meeting of the Working Group, Glion,
Switzerland, Sept. 1987. World Council of Churches, Geneva.
2. Charles Birch and John B. Cobb. The libemtion of life: From the
Cell to the Community. Cambridge University Press, 1981.
3. Jay McDaniel, p. 130 in Church & Society: Report and
Background Papers, Meeting of the Working Group, Glion,
Switzerland, Sept. 1987. World Council of Churches, Geneva.

25

